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CH IN ESE TR A D E UN IO NS IN TH E TRANSITION FROM  SOCIALISM :
TH E EM ERG EN CE OF CIVIL SOCIETY OR TH E RO AD TO CO RPORATISM ?
Gordon White
With the publication o f  the W orld Bank's W orld Developm ent Report 1995 which 
deals with issues o f  labour and employment, the significance o f  trade union organisations in the 
econom ic and political life o f  developing and post-socialist societies has m oved up the policy 
and research agendas J  In the econom ic sphere there is a realisation that trade unions are a 
desirable response to the dem ands o f  workers who are trying to im prove their wages and 
working conditions and protect them selves against the flagrant abuses o f  workers' rights which 
are a com m onplace o f  developm ent within a market fram ework, particularly in its early stages. 
At the same time, the W orld Bank and other developm ent agencies are worried about the 
potentially negative consequences o f  trade unions, in terms o f  capturing econom ic rents in 
m onopoly sectors or bidding up w ages above hypothetical m arket rates. By contrast it is 
recognised that trade unions can play positive economic roles by stabilising industrial relations 
and im proving productivity by raising the morale and comm itm ent o f  the workforce.
Therefore, the key policy question in the economic sphere, as defined by the Bank at least, is 
how  to m axim ise the positive econom ic impact o f  unions while m inimising their negative 
impact. From  the Bank's perspective, the main benchm ark for distinguishing "positive" from 
"negative" is the extent to which unions impede or facilitate the workings o f  a competitive 
m arket economy.
But the W orld Bank also recognises that trade unions have played, and are likely to 
continue to play, an im portant political role in the evolution o f  developing and transitional 
societies. In the case o f  the erstwhile socialist countries, workers' organisations played a key 
role in w eakening the hold o f  the Com m unist Party in Poland. During the recent w ave o f  
democratisation in developing societies formerly ruled by authoritarian regimes, trade unions 
were at the forefront o f  the dem ocratic movement in countries such as South Korea and 
Zam bia.^ Longer-range studies o f  the democratisation in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century have em phasised the central role played historically by trade unions in extending
1 Som e critical T hird W orld  analysts are suspicious o f  the W orld Bank's d iscovery o f  labour and em ploym ent 
issues and d ism iss it as crocodile tears designed to appease protectionist pressures in the industrialised w orld. N o 
doubt such political pressures do exist and they should be a subject for future investigation. O n the narrow er issue 
o f  trade unions, I am inclined to  attribute m uch o f  the new  interest on the part o f  developm ent agencies to  the 
sim ple fact that free and assertive unions are now  m uch m ore part o f  the scene in developing countries than in a 
previous era w hen they  w ere "taken care o f ' by  authoritarian regim es o f  various hues.
2 For a case-study o f  the im pact o f  trade unions and other social organisations on the dem ocratisation process in 
South K orea and Zam bia, see W hite 1995.
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dem ocracy in the industrialised societies o f  W estern Europe.^ Analysts who are currently 
stressing the importance o f  organisations in "civil society" for the consolidation and deepening 
o f  embryonic dem ocracies in poor societies have stressed the potential importance o f  trade 
unions in addition to business and professional associations and grass-roots NG Os.^
Clearly the econom ic and political dimensions o f  the role o f  trade unions are intertwined. 
In the recent past, authoritarian regimes o f  various types prevented trade unions from operating 
effectively, either by outright repression or corporatist controls or a combination o f  both.5 To 
the extent that trade unions are now operating in increasingly democratic environm ents, it is to 
be expected that union organisation, activity and influence will increase and they will use their 
new-found freedoms to dem and higher wages and better working conditions for their social 
constituency. Indeed, much o f  the political impetus behind recent trade union struggles for 
democratisation has reflected their desire to do just that. From the perspective o f  the 
hegem onic international developm ent agencies, they must be encouraged to do this in a 
m oderate and realistic fashion. There is a sensitivity to the fact that "myopic" unions may 
provide political support for various forms o f  "economic populism" which is a non-venial sin in 
the current catechism  o f  Economic Correctness.
These issues concerning the economic and political role o f  unions are o f  growing 
importance in China, a country with a labour force o f  over 680 million undergoing a spurt o f  
economic growth which has outpaced m ost o f  its rivals over the past decade and a half. The 
dramatic transition to a "socialist m arket economy" has changed Chinese econom y and society 
beyond recognition since the program me o f  post-M ao market-oriented reforms began in 1979. 
The rapid diversification o f  the economic structure and the quasi-privatisation o f  a large part o f  
it has created a socio-econom ic context in which the old-style Party dom inated unions are 
increasingly obsolete. This raises central questions about the economic and political role o f  
China's trade unions. On the economic side, how can they find a new role in an econom y in 
which m arket relations are increasingly d om inan t; on the political side, to what extent do the 
pressures and opportunities created by a market economy enable these previously subordinated 
Leninist "transmission belts" to gain greater social and political autonom y - in short, to becom e 
part o f  a new "civil society" which emerges along with, and as a consequence of, market 
reform in a state socialist society? Alternatively, will they seek a new role which, while 
increasing their freedom o f  action, retain their close link with the Party/state through some form 
o f  corporatist arrangement? As the pace o f  economic reform accelerated in the early-mid 
nineties, these issues becam e increasingly urgent. Chinese trade unions stand at a crossroads
3 For exam ple, see Rueschem eyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992.
4 For discussion o f  the link betw een "civil society" and dem ocratisation, see several o f  the contributions to 
Luckham  and W hite (forthcom ing) and Robinson (1995).
5 T aiw an provides a fascinating case o f  the com bination o f  repression and incorporation; for an in-depth study 
o f  the authoritarian period o f  labour relations and its erosion in the 1980's, see Lai 1994.
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with the economic and political earth shifting beneath their feet. They desperately need a new 
direction, but which way to go and how? These are the issues which this paper addresses.
Our analysis is organised as follows. The first section briefly discusses the role o f  trade 
unions before the post-M ao economic reforms began in 1979; the second describes the ways in 
which their socio-econom ic environm ent has changed and the challenges this has posed; the 
third analyses the extent to which the unions have adapted their economic and political roles to 
this new environment; and the final section will reflect on the dilemmas which the trade unions 
face in finding a new role in an increasingly m arket-oriented econom y still operating under the 
aegis o f  a basically unreform ed, one-party political system.
Unions in the Pre-Reform  Era
W e shall use broad brush-strokes here since detailed studies o f  the history o f  post­
revolutionary Chinese unionism  are available.(Lee 1986) A  national union system was 
established after the Chinese Com m unist Party came to power in 1949 and their functions were 
codified in a Trade Union Law issued in 1950.6 Thereafter they were incorporated into the 
system o f  centralised econom ic planning and one-party political hegem ony established in the 
early and m id-1950s; their role was defined along traditional Soviet-style Leninist lines as 
"transmission-belts" for the ruling Party with their internal organisation operating according to 
the top-dow n principle o f  "democratic centralism". They took on the form o f  a national 
federation (the All-China Federation o f  Trade Unions or ACFTU), com posed o f  national 
unions based on industrial sectors. M embership included both manual and mental workers and 
theoretically was open to all workers in the waged sector, which included private and joint- 
operation enterprises in the early years after the Revolution, but eventually applied almost 
exclusively to the state and urban collective sector which emerged after the "socialist 
transform ation o f  industry" in 1956. In a largely agricultural country, therefore, the unions 
only represented a small percentage o f  the national labour force. On the eve o f  the reforms in 
1978, for example, even after nearly three decades o f  industrialisation, the urban 
state/collective workforce constituted only 23.7 per cent o f  the total workforce.(SSB 1993: 79) 
In 1981, which is the first year when reliable statistics on union m em bership becam e available 
in the post-M ao period, about 84 per cent o f  the urban state/collective workforce were counted 
as union members. (ZGTN 1992: 85)
The Federation was hierarchically organised according to the principle o f  "dual 
leadership" whereby individual unions have their own national organisation but are integrated 
at each level by a branch o f  the ACFTU. The union system itself was subordinated to the 
leadership o f  the Com m unist Party, a relationship which was particularly close and pervasive
6 For the relevant docum ents, see T he Trade Union Law o f  the People's R epublic o f  C hina, Beijing: Foreign 
Languages P ress, 1950.
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given the official ideology that the unions, as mass organisations o f  the working class, were a 
basic foundation o f  comm unist power. Thus at national and local levels, the ACFTU branch 
was subordinate to the Party committee at each level; in the enterprise, there was a single basic- 
level union branch, the chairperson o f  which was answerable to the "dual leadership" o f  both a 
superior union organisation and the enterprise Party secretary.
Though the unions were clearly subordinate to the Party in both theory and practice, 
their role as a "transmission belt" was inherently ambiguous. On the one side, their main 
responsibility was to transmit the Party's current ideological line and policies to the urban 
working-class and try to secure their support and compliance. This gave them both political 
responsibilities such as ideological education and economic functions such as mobilising 
workers to increase productivity, maintain enterprise discipline, improve their technical skills, 
contribute to technical innovation drives and the like. On the other side, they had the officially 
recognised responsibility "to protect the interests o f  workers and staff members" (Trade Union 
Law 1950: Article 7) and transmit the opinions and problems o f  their members to the 
Party/governm ent authorities.
This basic ambiguity thrust the unions into the uncom fortable role o f "middlemen" and 
led to fluctuations in their behaviour over time as they sought to resolve its inherent 
contradiction. There were three m ajor crises in the relationship between the unions and the 
Party during the pre-reform era. In the first, during 1950-51 under the leadership o f  Li Lisan, 
there was a move to assert the autonom y o f  the unions and their role as representative o f  the 
specific interests o f  urban workers. The CCP leadership responded by criticising Li Lisan and 
other union leaders, replacing Li as head o f  the ACFTU and re-establishing the principle and 
reality o f  union subordination to Party leadership. In the second upheaval, during the latter part 
o f  the Hundred Flowers M ovem ent in 1957, the same impetus towards organisational 
autonom y re-appeared under the new leader o f  the ACFTU, Lai Royu. The Party leadership 
again responded by re-imposing the principle o f  Party dom inance and replacing Lai and his 
group in 1958. The events o f  1956-57 vividly illustrated the dilemmas facing hapless union 
cadres whose impotence and subservience to the Party made them  unable to respond 
effectively to the demands o f  their members. M any urban workers lost confidence in the 
unions during this period and expressed their discontent through strikes and other forms o f  
protest. The resolution o f  the conflict through the reassertion o f  Party control over the unions 
reduced their role even further because able and ambitious people tended to avoid union work 
as personally frustrating and unrewarding in career terms. Even though there was some 
minimal progress in improving their status in the early 1960's, they encountered a third crisis in 
1966 when they fell victim to the leftist onslaught o f  the Cultural Revolution. During this 
m ovem ent, the small role they had played in representing the material interests o f  workers was 
castigated as economist , welfarist" and "syndicalist". Once again, urban workers founded
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alternative organisations to express their discontents, in the form o f  myriads o f  "revolutionary 
rebel" groups and local W orkers Representative Congresses. A fter 1966, the unions 
disappeared as a separate institutional entity and the ACFTU was not reconstituted as a national 
body until the beginning o f  the reform era in 1978.7
In sum, in spite o f  their activism in the early post-revolutionary years, on the eve o f  the 
reform  era the trade unions had been reduced to peripheral institutions through successive 
waves o f  political subordination and attack. As o f  1978, they had not had a national congress 
for over twenty years and the Law which theoretically governed their activities was nearly 
three decades old and grossly obsolete. Their impotence was painfully apparent, sandwiched 
as they were between the Party which used them as a political instrument and a social 
constituency which recognised their weakness and had intermittently resorted to other m ethods 
and organisations to assert their interests. That labour protest had not been more pronounced 
reflected the fact that urban workers were a relatively privileged stratum in post-revolutionary 
society: lauded as "masters o f  the country", insulated against a potentially threatening labour 
influx from  the countryside and granted favourable wage and welfare benefits not shared by 
labourers outside the urban state-collective sector. There was in fact an implicit "social 
compact" in operation through which workers exchanged their cooperation for relatively 
favourable treatment. At the enterprise level, this social com pact operated through a system o f  
implicit bargaining and accom m odation between m anagem ent and workforce which operated 
in informal and clientelistic ways and served further to m arginalise the formal role o f  basic- 
level union b r a n c h e s . ^ The enterprise or "unit" largely defined the confines o f  workers' lives 
and unions did not serve to provide "horizontal" links between workers in different firms. The 
enterprise union branch was integrated within a vertical system o f  authority which insulated 
each enterprise within the familiar cellular structure o f  pre-reform  urban society, the "unit 
system".
For over a decade before the reforms began, then, the unions had been decim ated as a 
separate institutional force and played virtually no role in Chinese industrial relations.
How ever, if  one looked back beyond the Cultural Revolution to the first decade o f  the 
revolutionary regime in the 1950's, there was evidence that the unions were capable o f 
independent initiative and had not acted as mere tools o f  a Leninist party. Thus the history o f  
China's trade unions in the pre-reform  era cannot be captured by a simple "totalitarian" model 
o f  subordination to the Party and Chinese experience o f  intermittent union activism conforms 
to a w ider picture o f  the variable role o f  trade unions in comm unist systems elsewhere, (for a 
survey, see Pravda and Ruble 1986)
7 For account o f  these cardinal events in the pre-reform  history o f  the unions, see H arper 1969, and Lee 1986. 
l o r analyses o f  the activities o f  w orkers in these upheavals, see Perry 1992 and Lynn W hite 1989.
8 W alder (1986) described this system  o f  industrial relations as "com m unist neo-traditionalism ”.
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The Challenges Posed by Econom ic Reform
From the mid-1950's on the unions had been operating in a context which was 
relatively stable socio-economically and highly unstable politically. The environm ent they 
were to face during the reform era was to prove very different. Between the late 1970's and the 
m id-1990's, rapid change in the economic and social system was accom panied by relatively 
marginal changes in the political system. M arket reforms changed the econom ic context o f  the 
unions in m ajor ways. Linder the impact o f  rapid industrial growth, their own constituency o f  
workers in the urban public sector expanded relatively slowly and the rate o f  unionisation was 
able to keep pace.9 However, other economic sectors - private, "new collective" and foreign- 
invested - expanded more rapidly, in particular rural small-scale "township and village 
enterprises" which by 1992 were employing nearly 106 million people out o f  a total rural 
workforce o f  438 million, compared with a mere 28.3 million in 1978 (SSB 1993: 75 and 360)
. The num ber o f  workers in private enterprises or self-employed in the cities rose from a mere 
150,000 in 1978 to over 11 million in 1993 with the rate o f  increase accelerating dram atically 
in the m id-1990's.(SSB 1994: 20) The workforce in foreign-invested enterprises in the Special 
Economic Zones and elsewhere had reached nearly three million by 1992 and expanded even 
more rapidly thereafter as foreign investment increased.
In spite o f  these dramatic changes in the economy at large, the traditional socio­
economic citadel o f the unions - the urban public sector o f  state and "big collective" enterprises 
- changed relatively little. Until the early 1990's, the lives o f  workers in these firms were still 
largely unaffected by enterprise reforms whose impact had so far been superficial. Our survey 
o f  the attitudes o f  workers in two industrial cities conducted in late 1992 suggests that m ost 
were still living in the old world o f  the "unit" with its traditional state-socialist comm itm ents to 
worker welfare and se cu rity .^  W orkers still felt a high degree o f  solidarity with and 
comm itm ent to their enterprise. ^  1 W hile concerned about levels o f  provision o f  welfare and 
wage benefits within the enterprise and worried about broader societal trends such as inflation,
9 The urban public sector includes both  slate enterprise and the so-called "big collective” enterprises w hich w ere 
in effect quasi-state enterprises. B etw een them , these tw o sectors em ployed nearly  all the urban w orkforce before 
1979. The w orkforce o f  state enteqjrises increased from 76.9 million in 1979 to  110.9 m illion in 1993 w hile that 
o f  urban collectives grew  from 22.7 to  36 million over the sam e period.(SSB 1994: 22) The rate o f  unionisation 
in state enterprises, based on A CFTU  figures w ith low er aggregates than the above State Statistical Bureau 
estim ates, rose from 84.7 per cent in 1981 to 93 per cent in 1991 (ZG TN  1992: 85) w hile the SSB itself estim ated 
the rate to be about 92 per cent as o f  1992 (SSO  1993: 284).
10 These w ere the large, heavy-industrial city o f  Shenyang in the N orth-Eastern province o f  L iaoning and the 
m edium -sized, light -industrial city o f  N antong in the Central-Eastern province o f  Jiangsu. T he research project as 
a w hole w as conducted by a U .K. research team  based at the Institute o f  D evelopm ent Studies, including the 
author and Shang X iaoyuan from the IDS and Jude Howell o f  the School o f  D evelopm ent Studies, U niversity  o f  
East A nglia. T his specific field survey w as conducted in collaboration w ith C hinese colleagues from the Centre 
for Social S tatistics at the Chinese People's U niversity, Beijing. Financial support for the research w as provided 
by the U .K . Econom ic and Social R esearch Council to w hich thanks are due.
11 W hen asked about their attitudes to their enterprise, over 90 per cent o f  those expressing an opinion claim ed 
either that they w ere "m asters o f  the enterprise" or shared strong com m on interests w ith  it.
6
corruption and increasing incom e inequality, there was still no clear evidence o f  feelings o f  
insecurity and threat. However, there was a straw in the wind detectable in their attitudes to 
the "three system s reform" campaign - intended to m ake terms o f  em ploym ent and wages more 
flexible - which was under way during 1992; over 50 per cent o f  w orkers who indicated an 
opinion on this campaign expressed various degrees o f  disquiet. This disquiet was even more 
evident in personal interviews with individual workers, particularly older people nearing their 
retirement.
In retrospect, this was probably the dying era o f  the urban "unit system". By the mid- 
1990's, this still relatively comfortable and secure world was under more sustained attack and 
urban public sector workers were finding themselves under increasing pressure from various 
sources. Before 1979 urban and rural labour markets had been separated by a comprehensive 
system o f  controls based on residence certificates and ration entitlements. By the 1990's this 
had broke down and rural labourers were flocking into the cities in increasing numbers. As a 
result, a "floating population" o f  temporary, casual and unem ployed labourers accum ulated in 
the cities, the latter constituted a new "reserve army" o f  urban surplus labour which radically 
changed the previous situation o f  virtually full employment. M oreover, the traditional base o f  
the urban working-class - state and large collective enterprises - cam e under increasing pressure 
to change their labour practices as they were pushed to compete in the m arket and efforts were 
m ade to semi-privatise them  through the introduction o f  a share system in the m id -1 9 9 0 's .^  
The num ber o f  public-sector bankruptcies, mergers and rationalisations rose and reformers 
increased their pressure to abolish the principle o f  job  tenure in state enterprises and to give 
m anagers m ore flexibility in personnel decisions. M anagers were granted greater pow er to 
discipline, hire and fire workers and encouraged to reduce the high level o f  "hidden 
unem ploym ent" caused by overstaffing (estimated to be as high as 20 per cent o f  the state 
workforce) by shedding personnel. This led to various forms o f  labour extrusion, including 
outright unem ploym ent, part-time working or lay-offs on a low rate o f  pay, early retirement or 
reallocation to ancillary small enterprises. Although the official rate o f  urban unem ploym ent 
rem ained low (2.6 per cent in 1993), the real rate was much higher and the threat o f  a rapid 
increase was beginning to cause concern among public sector workers which found expression 
in various forms o f  unrest in the m id-1990's, such as street dem onstrations and work stoppages. 
The burden o f  unem ploym ent has fallen disproportionately on w om en.' 3 W omen have also 
suffered from the fact that enterprise managers have used their greater autonom y to refuse to 
recruit women workers whom  they regard as more expensive, w hereas in the past they were 
impelled to accept quotas set by the local labour bureau. M oreover, m ost o f  the official
12 For an overview  o f  these industrial reforms, see W hite 1993: chap. 4.
13 O ur 1992 survey, conducted at a tim e w hen overall w orries about unem ploym ent am ong urban public-sector 
w orkers w ere apparently  still not s ig n ifican t, reveals that w om en w orkers w ere still perceived as relatively 
vulnerable. W hen asked w hether it w as true that w om en w orkers w ould find it m ore difficult to  keep their jo b s  if  
som e w orkers had to  be laid off, 63 per cent o f  respondents replied that this w as tm e o r nearly  true.
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unem ployed (84 per cent in 1993) were young people who were unable to find form al-sector 
jobs when entering the labour market, whereas older workers were more successful in holding 
on to their existing jobs. ^  Overall, the accelerating impact o f  economic reform in the early- 
mid 1990's has generated a new set o f  issues o f  growing concern to workers in the state sector 
to which unions have been under increasing pressure to respond.
These economic reforms have brought about deeper changes in the social context o f  
industrial relations as the character and inter-relations o f  the main social groups involved has 
changed. In state enterprises, the pace o f  change has been much slower than economic 
reformers had hoped, but the pow er o f  professional managers has increased in relation to both 
the Party organisation and the workforce and there is a push to introduce new styles o f  
"scientific management" to raise labour productivity and improve labour discipline. These 
pressures were given added impetus by the move to transform property relations in state 
enterprises which gathered m om entum  in the mid 1990's. In the econom y at large, the 
diversification o f  ownership has exposed Chinese workers to managerial environm ents which 
are very different to that in public enterprises. Particularly in larger capitalist enterprises in the 
jo in t or foreign sector, industrial relations have m oved closer to those in capitalist enterprises in 
the hom e countries o f  the investors, changing the character o f  industrial relations in ways 
which have led to increasing pressures for unions to extend their organisational reach to 
represent the interests o f  workers in this new sector.
If  the trade unions find themselves confronted on one side by the rise o f  m ore powerful 
and professional m anagers and a private bourgeoisie, on the other side the social character o f  
Chinese workers has been changing. It has become more segmented between w orkers in the 
different sectors. W orkers in the "new collective", private and foreign sectors are not been 
unionised as yet, while workers in state enterprises have become more dem anding and assertive 
as the success o f  the reforms has increased their expectations about material advancem ent.
State workforces have becom e divided between younger workers seeking material 
im provem ent who have less o f  a feeling o f  loyalty to their enterprises and are m ore likely to 
m ove elsewhere in search o f  higher wages. To them, the present union organisation is largely 
irrelevant, since it has no influence over the level o f  wages. However, older workers with a 
long service-record in a particular enterprise feel threatened by the reforms because they fear 
becom ing unem ployed or losing their pension. They look to the unions to protect them, a task 
which is awkward given the fact that Party reformers expect the unions to help them  to 
im plem ent the very enterprise reforms which may cause unemployment and threaten pensions.
Unions have thus found themselves caught in a social nutcracker between a 
constituency which is becoming more diverse and demanding and emerging new
14 T he statistics on unem ploym ent cited here are in SSB 1994: 23.
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m anagerial/proprietary adversaries who are becoming m ore powerful and changing their 
approach to industrial relations in consequence. They are pushed in radically different 
directions: as an organisational com ponent o f  an embattled sector - urban public enterprises - 
they are impelled to play a conservative role; as the potential defender o f  an emergent 
proletariat in the non-public sector, they are under pressure to be activist and innovative. Their 
dilem m a is intensified by their contradictory political role as a pillar o f  state pow er and 
representative o f  w orkers' interests. An increasingly wide gap has opened up between the 
official ideological description o f  workers as "masters" o f  the country and the enterprise and 
the reality that they are turning into w age labourers in increasingly profit-oriented enterprises 
and into com m odities in an increasingly competitive labour market. W hile these trends have 
generated new  interests and dem ands which deserve union attention, this has conflicted with 
their role as an organisational instrument o f  the Party. As we shall see, the experience o f  
Chinese trade-unions over the reform  era represents an as yet unsuccessful effort to resolve this 
political contradiction.
To sum up, if  the role o f  the unions had been problematic before the reforms began, it 
becam e increasingly so thereafter. Since they straddled both the econom ic system, as an 
organiser o f  industrial relations, and the political system, as a pillar o f  Party/state power, their 
dilemm as increased. The econom ic system was changing rapidly while the political system 
rem ained Leninist. The unions resem bled a person trying to board a m oving train when one 
foot is being earned along by the train and the other is stuck on (indeed tethered to) the 
platform. The new  situation required a new role for the unions, not only by adjusting to the 
new  terrains o f  industrial relations, but also by changing their relationship to the Party to 
achieve the organisational freedom  necessary to adapt. To the extent that this would involve 
greater political autonom y and a strengthened ability to represent the interests o f  their m em bers, 
they w ould be m oving in the direction o f  becoming an institutional expression o f  "civil 
society". As the reform s deepened in the early-mid 1990's, these issues were beginning to 
reach critical proportions. Let us turn now to see how Chinese trade unions have attem pted to 
grapple with these contradictory pressures over the reform era as a whole.
The Changing Role o f the Unions: Their Relationship with the Party
The beginning o f  the economic reforms m arked a new dawn for the unions as they 
were resuscitated after over a decade o f  disuse. The ACFTU held its Ninth National Congress 
in October 1978, its first for 21 years, and the event showed a desire on the part o f  the CCP 
leadership that the unions return to the "normal" role they had played in the early and mid 
1950's. Supreme CCP leader Deng Xiaoping made a speech at the Congress and called for an 
increased role for the unions which would mean, in his words, that "they will not be 
superfluous as some people think they are". He defined the strategic role o f  the unions in terms
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o f  "educating and organising" their members to support the programme o f  economic reform 
and "helping the enterprises to cany  out these reforms smoothly". This required that unions 
should "teach their members to support the highly centralised administrative leadership in their 
enterprises and to help maintain the full authority o f  those who direct production" (Deng 1978: 
148). In addition to these traditional Leninist functions, however, unions were to play three 
specific roles: (i) as a force to strengthen the role o f workers in enterprise m anagement, in 
particular by functioning as the executive organ o f workers representative congresses (W RCs) 
which were to be established in all enterprises as a check on m anagement and a channel for 
workers opinions and demands; (ii) as an agency to advance the welfare o f  workers, in terms o f  
income, working conditions and fringe benefits; (iii) to oppose "bureaucracy" and stand up for 
the "democratic rights" o f  workers.
W hile this authoritative definition o f  the unions' role did allow them some scope for 
representing the interests o f  their constituency, it still contained the contradictory elements 
which bedevilled the unions before 1978 and continued to do so throughout the reform  era. 
First, their strategic responsibility to support official reform policies continued to take 
precedence over their responsibilities to their members. Since the reforms threatened the 
interests o f  their existing members and created new categories o f  workers outside their current 
organisational scope but potentially in need o f  their protection, this put the unions in the 
uncom fortable middle. Second, since the role o f  the unions was inherently ambiguous, it was 
hard for union officials to know  the exact parameters o f  permissible activity in any given 
situation and they were constantly subject to P a r t y / g o v e r n m e n t  officials who retained the 
discretionary pow er to resolve any ambiguity. Since the Trade Union Law was out o f  date, 
there was a need to re-codify the role o f  trade unions in order to clarify their specific functions 
and protect their exercise from arbitrary official interference.
The history o f  the trade unions during the reform era is o f  their attempts to resolve these 
two basic problems. The central issue was the nature o f  their relationship with the Party.
From its own institutional perspective, the Party needed the unions for two important reasons: 
first, to keep the workers loyal to its overall authority and prevent any opposition, unrest or 
organised challenge on the part o f  workers; and, second, to smooth the path to economic 
reform by mediating between policy-makers/implementers and workers. These would be the 
concerns o f  any Leninist regime engaged in economic reform, but they were given a particular 
urgency in the Chinese case by two sets o f  events. The first was the rise o f  the Solidarity union 
in Poland in 1980 and its potential demonstration effect in China; the second was the w ave o f  
urban protest leading up to the Tiananm en events and the Beijing M assacre on June 4, 1989. 
The exam ple o f  Solidarity had some impact within China during 1980 and 1981 when labour 
unrest spread across the country. 1 his was largely a response to economic grievances, but 
there was at least one case (at a steel mill in Taiyuan in the northern province o f  Shanxi) where
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protest took a political form in a dem and for independent unions and a change o f  r e g i m e .   ^5 
W hile the Party leadership at the time sought to re-emphasise the rhetoric and reality o f  Party 
control over the unions, they recognised that protest arising from economic discontent could 
spill over into political opposition and this strengthened their resolve to push through an 
economic reform program m e which could reduce the potential for urban unrest by raising 
w orking class living standards.
The Polish precedent also impelled more liberal reformers in the Party to consider ways 
in which the relationship between the Party and the unions could be amended to reduce the 
pressure for, and the prospect of, a Chinese version o f  Solidarity. In the early and mid 1980's 
there were efforts to rethink the relationship between the Party and the unions to allow greater 
autonom y for the latter. This momentum  received support from those reformers within the top 
Party leadership (such as Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang) who were willing to admit the need 
to reform political as well as economic institutions, specifically to m ove in a more "pluralist" 
direction by allowing mass organisations such the trade unions greater independence from 
Party constraint. It was also given strength by an emergent reformist current within the 
resuscitated trade union apparatus itself, a fact which becam e apparent as the ACFTU gradually 
sought to assert itself as a force to be reckoned with not only within the enterprise but also in 
the political process at large by claiming a greater say in policy-m aking on labour-related 
issues.
This impetus from the unions found its first weak expression at their Tenth National 
Congress in 1983 when the ACFTU head Ni Zhifu stressed the need to strengthen the unions' 
basic-level branches in factories and extend their role in enterprise m anagem ent through their 
link with the workers representative congresses.  ^6 The ACFTU organ, W orkers Daily, 
gradually took on an advocacy role on behalf o f  workers and unions and the ACFTU 
sponsored surveys o f  workers attitudes, the results o f  which were cited to support their claim 
for greater union power. O f those interviewed in a survey conducted in 1986, for example,
56%  said that the status o f  trade unions in their enterprises had dropped over recent years; 70% 
expressed doubts about the efficacy o f  their workers representative congress; and over one 
third said that their relations with enteiprise management had deteriorated o f  late. In the eyes 
o f  reformers within the ACFTU, the survey reflected certain "strong demands" on the part o f  
workers to which it was the unions' job  to respond.  ^7
15 For a detailed account o f  the im pact o f  Polish events on Chinese politics from 1980 to 1990, see W ilson
1990.
16 Ni Zhifu 's speech to  the C ongress w as published in R enm in Ribao (People's D aily), Beijing, 27 O ctober 
1983; an English text can be found in B B C , Sum m ary o f  W orld Broadcasts: Far East, (hereafter S\V B :F E ) 
7489, 12 N ovem ber 1983.
17 Z hongguo X inw ensh c (China N ew s Agency), 14 O ctober 1986, translated in BBC, SW B :F E , 8393.
National union leaders gradually became more vocal in making public complaints 
about Party interference and union impotence. In 1987, for example, ACFTU vice-president 
Luo Gan protested about Party interference in elections for basic-level union officials and 
argued the need for a new Trade Union Law.  ^^ This increasing institutional self-confidence 
was encouraged by the then Party secretary-general Zhao Ziyang in his report to the Thirteenth 
National Congress o f  the CCP in October 1987 when he supported greater independence for 
trade unions and other mass organisations and invited them to undertake organisational reform 
as part o f  a broad program me o f  reforming the political structure.  ^9 The ACFTU responded 
promptly by convening a meeting o f 400 union leaders from different levels and localities in 
December 1987 to produce a preliminary draft o f  a program me for trade union reform. A t this 
meeting, an ACFTU vice-president argued that the unions, as presently constituted, did not 
properly represent the interests o f  workers and were not trusted by them. Citing another recent 
survey o f  worker attitudes, he said that at least 40%  o f  union members did not regard unions as 
their own organisations and 20% did not know anything about their activities. The unions, he 
argued, were in fact acting as government organisations and were alienated from their 
members; the main aim o f  reform should be to establish union organisations which were 
formed voluntarily by workers and staff them selves.2 *^ In the spring o f  the following year, 
similar themes were repeated by the head o f  the ACFTU, Ni Zhifu, who linked the issue o f  
trade-union reform unam biguously with the need for overall political system reform when he 
complained that the current political system had converted the unions into a "work departm ent 
o f  the Party or even a subsidiary organisation o f  the governm ent" and when union officers 
really tried to represent the interests o f  their members they were still accused o f  "economism" 
or "syndicalism", regardless o f  official policies to prevent this kind o f  allegation.21
This m omentum peaked at the Eleventh National Congress o f  the ACFTU in O ctober 
1988 where debate was described as "hot" by people interviewed later who had attended the 
meeting.22 The conclusions o f  the conference were summed up in an authoritative editorial in 
the CCP organ, People's Daily, which called for the acceleration o f  trade union reforms which 
would provide greater independence o f  Party and government, more influence in policy­
m aking on issues which affected the interests o f  labour and greater efforts to represent the 
interests o f  their m e m b e r s .2 3  The head o f  the ACTFU, Ni Zhifu, summed up the main
18 L iaow ang (Outlook), overseas edition, 10 A ugust 1987, translated in BBC, SW B :F E , 8655.
19 Zhao Ziyang, "Advance A long the Road o f  Socialism  w ith C hinese Characteristics", B eijing R ev iew , 9-15 
N ovem ber 1987, p. xx.
20 Z hongguo X inw enshe (China N ew s Agency), 18 D ecem ber 1987, translated in BBC, SW B :F E , 0038.
21 R enm in Ribao (People's D aily), 30 April 1988, translated in BBC, SW B :F E , 0157. The A C FT U  itse lf had 
people w orking on reform proposals: for example, see the collections o f  articles in Z G G Y Y JS 1988b and T ian  and 
Xu 1988.
22 For a detailed follow -up list o f  questions concerning the C ongress, see G Y Y J 1988.
23 "Speed up the pace o f  trade union reform s...”, R enm in R ibao, 22 O ctober 1988, translated in BBC, 
SW B :F E , 0291.
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dem ands o f  the unions when he stated in his speech to the Congress that "the relationship 
between the trade unions and the Party and governm ent should be readjusted and the trade 
unions must be able to carry out their duties independently according to law".24 The Congress 
called for speedy enactment o f  a new Trade Union Law and m apped out a program me o f  
organisational reform.25 The leadership o f  the ACFTU was rejigged to carry the reform 
process forward, notably by the accession o f  a reformer, Zhu Houze, as a vice-president and 
first secretary o f  the secretariat. It was highly significant that Zhu and others had been elected 
by a m ethod whereby the num ber o f  candidates exceeded the num ber o f  seats, the first time 
ever in the history o f  the ACFTU. Shortly after the Congress, experimental trade union 
reforms were set in motion, including what were called certain "elements o f  W estern trade 
unionism" such as a new system  o f  choosing union officials called the "representation system". 
By early 1989, the ACFTU presidium  had designated ten cities for "com prehensive reform o f 
urban trade unions".2^
However, the surge towards reforming the unions becam e caught up in the widespread 
urban unrest in the spring o f  1989 which culminated in the Beijing M assacre o f  June 4 and in 
the fissures which opened up within the Party leadership over how  to deal with the unrest and 
how  to inteipret its relationship with the accelerating pace o f  both economic and political 
system reform. The ACFTU found itself split on how to react to these events. On the one hand, 
particularly through the voice o f  its chairman Ni Zhifia, it tried to discourage strikes and other 
forms o f  mass action by urban workers. However, there was considerable sympathy for the 
issues raised by the student m ovem ent among staff at the A CFTU  headquarters in Beijing. For 
example, their office held "dialogue meetings" with student representatives in mid M ay and 
called on Party leaders to follow suit; the ACFTU also donated 100,000 yuan to the Red Cross 
to provide medical aid for students on hunger strike in Tiananm en Square.
Never more than then was the contradictory nature o f  the unions' institutional position 
so vividly illuminated. W hile they m ay have succeeded in their effort to restrain workers from 
entering the urban mass m ovem ent in a big way, the political ground was slipping away 
beneath their feet. For the first time, they found themselves challenged by the appearance o f  
alternative, independent organisations which derided the ACFTU's claim to represent the 
interests o f  Chinese workers and accused it o f  being a tool o f  an increasingly corrupt Party.
The m ost prominent o f  these was the Beijing W orkers' A utonom ous Federation which was in 
evidence in Tiananmen Square in M ay-June, but there were also equivalents in a num ber o f  big 
cities across the nation. Once again, the Polish precedent reared its head, an echo given force
24  N i's speech w as reported by the N ew  C hina N ew s A gency in Beijing on 22 O ctober 1988.
25 For a com m entary on the Trade U nion Law, see "W hy the difficult birth o f  the new  trade unions law ”, N ew  
C hina N ew s A gency, Beijing, 27 O ctober 1988.
26 Beijing Radio (dom estic), 25 February 1989, translated in BBC, SW B :F E , 0397.
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by the appearance o f  a banner at one o f  the demonstrations which read "W here Are You, 
China's Lech W alesa?".27
This organisational challenge came at a time, moreover, when discontent had been 
m ounting among the ACFTU's constituency in response to increased tensions within the 
workplace as the power o f  m anagers gradually expanded and there were attempts to weaken 
the job  security o f public-sector workers through the introduction o f  a labour contract system. 
Urban workers were also worried by the inflation which escalated during 1988 and early 1989 
and resented that some people were getting rich out o f  the reforms at their expense, either 
through shaip business practices or official corruption. The urban W orkers' Autonom ous 
Federations and similar organisations that appeared in 1989 m ade much o f  this discontent, 
arguing that the workers were losing out from the reforms in relative terms and that the ACFTU 
was part o f  the problem not the solution. Even though the actual membership and impact o f 
these organisations was relatively m inuscule, therefore, they struck at the heart o f  the ACFTU 's 
dilemma.
The post-Tiananmen political scenario was hardly conducive to resolving this dilemma, 
since the new  Party leadership stopped the moves towards political reform which had been 
gaining m om entum  since the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987 (including trade union reform) 
and set about reimposing political control over a restive society. The trade unions were 
particularly important in this effort because, as one o f  the three m ass organisations 
underpinning the Party's power, their evident wavering during the 1989 events was especially 
alarming to the new Party leadership. M oreover, given the inevitably rocky road o f  economic 
reform which lay ahead, the Party needed the unions to help prevent an even m ore threatening 
repetition o f  the 1989 events, which this time might bring a discontented urban working class 
into the fray rather than standing on the sidelines as in 1989. This m ixture o f dependence on 
the unions with the desire to control them was the basis for a post-Tiananm en pact betw een the 
Party and the unions. This took the form o f  an arrangement w hereby the Party leaders were to 
accord greater priority to the concerns o f  urban workers, trade unions were to gain greater 
access to the policy-making process and more influence within the enterprise in return for their 
loyalty to Party leadership.
This implicit pact can be seen in the text o f the Circular issued by the Party Central 
Committee in early 1990 with the intent o f  "strengthening Party control over mass 
organisations".28 While the docum ent stressed the need for the unions to maintain a "correct 
political orientation" and obey the "unified leadership" o f  the Party at all levels, it also called on 
governm ents at all levels to establish a system o f "democratic participation" w hereby mass
27 For detailed accounts o f  the alternative w orkers' organisations in 1989, see C han 1993 and W alder/G ong 
1993.
28 For an edited text, see R cnm in R ibao (People's D aily), 1 February 1990, translated in BBC, S W B :F E , 0679.
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organisations could play a regular role in the local policy process. Since this new orientation 
abandoned efforts to reform trade unions by granting them greater autonom y, the leadership o f  
the ACFTU was changed to safeguard observance o f  the new arrangement. W hile Ni Zhifu 
held on to his post as president, the leading architect o f  union reform, Zhu Houze, was 
rem oved.
To some extent, the terms o f  the pact were observed in the years immediately after 
Tiananm en. The overall approach to economic reform  adopted by the Party leadership was 
sensitive to its effects on urban workers, notably in their efforts to introduce enterprise reforms 
gradually so as to avoid the spread o f  unemployment, and to establish a new system o f  social 
insurance and welfare to replace the enterprise-based arrangements em bodied in the "unit 
system". Trade unions did indeed succeed in playing a more im portant and regularised 
consultative role in the m aking and implementation o f  policy on issues affecting the interests o f  
their m em bers. There was some effort to restrain the growth o f  m anagerial pow er within 
enterprises and strengthen the role o f  unions and workers representative congresses. The long 
aw aited Trade U nion Law did eventually emerge in 1992 and was an im portant first step 
towards legal protection for trade union activities.
How ever, this arrangement rested on and reflected a slowing o f  the economic reform 
process which left the central problem  o f  reforming state enterprises unresolved. In effect, the 
unions becam e allies o f  conservative elements within the Party leadership in their desire to 
blunt or deflect the impact o f  enterprise reforms which more radical reformers saw as essential 
to achieve greater flexibility in the urban labour market and higher levels o f  labour 
productivity in state enterprises. It is unsurprising, therefore, that as the pace o f  economic 
reform  accelerated from early 1992 onwards, the relationship between the Party and the unions 
came under renew ed strain and the gap between official rhetoric and changing socio-econom ic 
reality becam e wider. Underneath the deadening continuity o f  the Party's official Leninist line 
about the need for mass organisations to be subject to political discipline, there were increasing 
pressures on the unions to redefine their relationship both with the Party and with the changing 
working class to retain their influence in a rapidly changing socio-econom ic environment. We 
can understand these pressures better if we place them in the context o f  the two main areas o f  
union concern: their influence on governmental policy-making and their role in the enterprise.
W orkers' Representative or "Transmission Belt"?
(a) The Policy Role o f Unions
As the economic reforms began to take effect in the early and mid 1980s, union 
officials at all levels realised that some o f its consequences were potentially dam aging to the 
interests o f  their current membership, whether at the enterprise level (such as the threat o f
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growing m anagerial pow er or the prospect o f  unem ploym ent as a result o f  bankruptcies or lay­
offs), or in society at large (such as the menace o f  inflation or the loss o f  guaranteed welfare 
benefits). W hile this prompted them to play a defensive role by opposing reforms which they 
felt were inimical to the interests o f  their members, they also sought to take on a m ore positive 
role by becom ing involved in the process o f  designing reform policies. Later in the decade, as 
the econom y rapidly diversified, they became sensitive to the growth o f  new sections o f  the 
workforce, in the foreign and jo int venture sector and in township and village industries. These 
new sectors required new policies and laws and again the unions felt it important to play a role 
in framing policies rather than ending up as a reluctant recipient.
This desire for policy power has been a consistent element o f  union strategy from the 
early 1980’s onwards. ACFTU president, Ni Zhifu, raised this issue at the federation's Tenth 
National Congress in October 1983 when he argued that union organisations should take an 
active part in discussing proposed reforms affecting the wage system, labour insurance, and 
workers' welfare, should participate in the drafting and revision o f  labour laws and should help 
supervise their application. 29 Similarly, the ACFTU Executive Committee, m eeting in 
N ovem ber 1985, issued a document which not only asserted that the legitimate policy concerns 
o f  unions extended beyond mere industrial to broader issues o f  urban developm ent, but also 
dem anded that the leading bodies o f  trade unions should take part in the process o f  draw ing up 
major policies for urban re fo rm .^
By the following year, union spokesmen were arguing for an even broader role in the 
formulation o f  national and local plans for economic and social developm ent, with specific 
requests for a "joint conference system" whereby governm ents would consult with unions on a 
regular basis and union representation on local economic structural reform  com m issions.(Tong 
1986) This was seen as part o f  a broader programme o f  "democratic dialogue" designed to 
institutionalise consultation between Party/state organs and society. In the following year, 
union vice-president Luo Gan spelled out the kind o f  participation the unions wanted in terms 
o f  four levels: the ACFTU at the national level, individual industrial unions at the sectoral level, 
provincial and city federations at the local level and grassroots trade unions at the unit level. 
Luo noted that the unions had already been involved in discussions on reform  o f  wages, prices 
and house rents and warned that crucial reform policies, such as the new responsibility system 
designed to regulate relations between enterprises and state departments or proposed changes 
in the areas o f  wages, bonuses and labour discipline, could only be put into effect with the
29 Ni Z hifu’s speech to  the Congress w as reported by  the N ew  C hina N ew s A gen cy , Beijing, 18 O ctober 1983, 
translated in Foreign Broadcast Inform ation Service, C hina R eport, (hereafter FB IS), 204.
30 "O pinions on strengthening urban trade unions' w ork in the course o f  econom ic structural reform ", a 
docum ent approved at the Third M eeting o f  the A CFTU  Executive C om m ittee on 13 N ovem ber 1985, reported in 
G ongren R ibao (W orkers Daily), Beijing, 15 N ovem ber 1985 and translated in FB IS, 15 N ovem ber 1985.
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cooperation o f  the trade unions.3 * This pressure was increased still further at the time o f  the 
Eleventh National Congress o f  the ACFTU in late 1988 when its president, Ni Zhifu, 
announced that "Chinese trade unions will enter the decision-m aking field at all levels on their 
own initiative and take part in the formulation o f state policies".32 Ni admitted that when this 
idea had been raised a few years previously, "quite a few people shook their heads", whereas 
now it had been "universally accepted by people with pleasure". He m ade it clear that the 
unions regarded certain areas o f  reform policy as o f  vital concern: prices, wages, housing, 
working conditions, social welfare issues such as accident, medical and unem ploym ent 
insurance, pensions and maternity benefits.33 These dem ands found support in the official 
Party newspaper, People's Daily, which stated that "the governm ent should report to the trade 
unions on m ajor events, and hold dialogues with the trade unions on important policies that 
involve the interests o f  staff and workers, to enable the unions truly to becom e a close 
cooperator and a social pillar o f  the govem m ent".34
Though there is evidence that the union was m aking some headway in claiming this 
policy role, the idea did have inherent problems. For one thing, they m ight get a seat the policy­
m aking table, but that did not guarantee them a meal, let alone a role in designing the menu.
As the People's Daily pointed out at the time, some Party and governm ent officials were 
accusing the unions o f  "putting on a rival show" against them.35 M oreover, at a time when the 
unions were trying to shake o ff  the image and the reality o f  being "officially ran" organisations, 
any m ove towards their becom ing a "close cooperator" with and a "social pillar" o f  governm ent 
ran the risk o f  com prom ising this intention. From the point o f  view  o f  more radical economic 
reformers, m oreover, this policy role was to be resisted because unions were seen as a 
conservative force, representing an obsolete and economically indefensible sector o f  the 
econom y and concerned with issues other than improving economic efficiency and developing 
m arkets. From the unions' point o f  view, on the other hand, influence on reform policies was 
essential to ensure that the a concern for efficiency was accom panied and tem pered by a 
concern for fairness.
It is hard to assess how far the unions had in fact managed to assert their role in 
governm ent before the Tiananm en events o f  mid 1989, given the lack o f  detailed case material. 
For example, the first "joint conference system" was not established until 1988 in the north­
western province o f  Shaanxi. However, as we noted above, the idea o f  guaranteed trade union 
involvem ent in the policy process did become part o f  their accommodation with the
31 L iaow ang (O utlook), overseas edition, 10 A ugust 1987, translated in BBC, S W B :F E , 8655.
32 "C hina's trade unions plan  to enter the state decision-m aking field on their ow n initiative", Z hongguo  
X in w enshc (China N ew s A gency), Beijing, 5 O ctober 1988, translated in BBC, S W B :F E , 0280.
33 N i's speech to the C ongress w as reported by  the N ew  C hina N ew s A gency in Beijing on 22 O ctober 1988.
34 "Speed up the pace o f  trade union reform s...", R cnm in Ribao (People's Daily), editorial, 22 O ctober 1988, in 
BBC, S W B :F E , 0291.
35 Ibid..
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conservative post-Tiananm en Party leadership. As part o f  this pact, the im portance o f  the 
"joint conference system" was re-emphasised and gradually extended to the rest o f  the country. 
Interviews conducted in 1991-1993 provided a better picture o f  the reality o f  the trade unions' 
role in policy-m aking and government. An official from the ACFTU's national Policy 
Research Office in Beijing argued, for example, that the political influence o f  the unions had 
increased significantly over the previous decade, pointing to a rise in the num ber o f  "double 
postings" across the country, whereby union officials held simultaneous posts in local Party 
and governm ent organs. He also claimed that union leaders were routinely consulted by policy 
m akers on key reform issues, citing a case in which the unions intervened successfully to 
change policy on the (excessively low) wages o f some workers in loss-making enterprises. 
Union representatives were also represented on special joint bodies set up to do research, 
provide advice or implement policy on specific issues such as wages and employment.
W hile counter-evidence suggests that the political influence o f  the ACFTU is not 
particularly great at the national level where it is dwarfed by the power o f  m any other 
bureaucracies with conflicting interests, the situation in the localities m ay vary.36 In the large 
industrial city o f  Shenyang in the north-eastern province o f  Liaoning, for example, the local 
branch o f  the ACFTU, which claimed a membership o f  1.77 million out o f  the two million 
workers in the city as o f  1992, had recently set up branches in the municipal administrative 
organs which had not existed previously. Its chairman was a m em ber o f  the standing 
committee o f  the city Party committee and a "joint conference" system had been in operation 
for three years whereby union leaders and worker representatives met annually with other 
departm ents o f  city governm ent to discuss issues o f  common concern. A  vice-chairm an o f  the 
union was also vice-chairman o f  the Three Systems Reform Office which was established in 
1992 to oversee reforms in the wage, social insurance and personnel systems and the union was 
represented on a num ber o f  other specialised commissions set up to coordinate reform  across 
sectors. Union officials also stated that, if  a big reform policy was in the air, the m ayor would 
send the preliminary proposal to the union for comment before draw ing up the final draft (one 
recent example had been the program me for housing reform). They felt that their influence had 
increased over recent years and the multiple channels for union representation in local 
governm ent seem to support this claim.37
One can see a similar picture in the small city o f Xiaoshan in a rapidly m odernising 
rural area in the eastern coastal province o f  Zhejiang, where union officials reported that, unlike 
previously, there was a trade union official on the standing committee o f  the city Party
36 Interview  w ith a vice-head o f  the A C F R J  Policy Research Office, Beijing, 21 Septem ber 1992. The relative 
political w eakness o f  the A C FT U  at the national level can be m easured by the fact that, according to  this 
interview , its president, N i Zhifu, w as only an ordinary m em ber o f  the C CP Central C om m ittee and a vice- 
chairm an o f  the N ational People's Congress, positions w hich do not suggest a great deal o f  political power.
37 Interview  w ith officials o f  the Shenyang M unicipal U nion Federation, O ctober 1992.
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committee and "joint conference system" was established in 1991 involving annual meetings 
between the local federation and top leaders in the city governm ent and Party.38 By contrast, 
in the light industrial city o f  Nantong in Jiangsu province, while similar m echanism s o f 
consultation were in place, there was no union representation on the city Party comm ittee's 
standing committee and this was the case in other cities across the province. Local officials 
said this was an anomaly because there was a formal docum ent which stipulated that union 
chairmen in industrially developed areas should be on the local Party standing com m ittee.39 in 
this case, there was a sense o f  resentment at pow er illegitimately denied and an aw areness that 
the political role o f  unions was more influential in other areas. For example, one union official 
from Nantong said with some envy that the union federation in Shanghai had real power. In 
fact, the Shanghai union federation was cited as a pioneer, as "a harbinger o f  the future 
direction o f  Chinese unions". In the case o f  Shanghai and other large cities such as Shenyang, 
for example, the union strategy for acquiring more power did not rest merely on gaining 
representation in or access to local Party and government agencies. It rested partly on their 
ability to collect and marshal information in support o f  their policy claims through increasingly 
sophisticated research departments. N antong officials, for example, com m ented admiringly 
that the price indices assem bled by the Shanghai union's research office had been proven to be 
superior to those o f  the national Bureau o f  Statistics and had been adopted by the latter as a 
yardstick for calculating wage levels. They also pointed out that the Shanghai union federation 
now  presided over several thousand enterprises, most o f  them in the tertiary or sendee sector, 
with a total output value o f  3.3 billion yuan. Revenue from this source enabled the union to 
intervene directly, for example, to provide financial support to unem ployed workers, to 
supplem ent pensions or provide other welfare services. Similarly, the unions in Shenyang were 
running 400 to 500 enterprises intended partly to bolster union finances and partly to provide 
jobs for unem ployed youth.
This independent source o f  revenue is o f  potentially crucial significance for m aintaining 
the financial position o f  unions over the longer term, since at present they rely on an officially 
guaranteed source o f  income comprising two per cent o f  the total wage-bill o f  state/large- 
collective enterprises. As enterprises becom e autonomous and, in particular, as state 
enterprises becom e share-based firms, this source o f  revenue may not be guaranteed in future. 
An independent source o f  revenue is also important because it enables unions to provide more 
sendees directly to their m em bers instead o f  relying merely on their ability to exert pressure on 
governm ent agencies to provide them. To the extent that this improves their ability to provide 
a "really effective defence" o f  the interests o f  urban workers, it is beginning to establish a more 
credible role as an independent representative o f  their interests. To some extent, this decreases 
the vulnerability o f  a union structure which, through an implicitly conservative alliance with
38 Interview  w ith the Mead o f  O ffice, X iaoshan M unicipal Union Federation, April 1991.
39 Interview  w ith officials o f  the N antong M unicipal U nion Federation, N ovem ber 1992.
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Party leaders since Tiananmen, is too w edded to a political status quo which is losing 
authority. To the extent that this leads to their becom ing increasingly immersed in the concerns 
and "group interests" of their constituents, it generates pressures to redefine their currently 
dependence on the Party/state in the direction o f  greater autonomy.
The paradox about this kind o f  close relationship between the unions and the Party in 
the policy-making sphere is that there is an exchange o f  autonomy for access - the Chinese call 
it the "support drawing relationship". The unions in effect achieve some variable degree of 
influence over reform policies at the cost o f  a greater intermeshing with the Party apparatus in 
general and its more conservative elements in particular. As such, it was a Faustian bargain in 
which the unions linked their fortunes and future to those of the Party and it marked a step 
backwards away from the efforts to achieve greater institutional autonomy in the years 
immediately preceding Tiananmen. It is hard to describe this as a form of "state 
corporatism",40 because the unions lack any degree o f  institutional autonomy which is a 
defining (though highly variable) characteristic o f  corporatist arrangements;^ the relationship 
is more like mistletoe on a branch. M oreover, the deal is not formalised, it applies unevenly 
across localities. At most one could say that certain conservative elements of the Party 
leadership are sympathetic to the specific interests o f  urban public sector workers, not the least 
because they regard them as an important elem ent in their political power base and are willing 
to grant the unions certain privileged access to the policy process in recognition of this.
Though this arrangement contains the glim m erings o f  corporatist thinking, it is highly 
contingent since it locks the unions into playing a largely "negative" role in the reform process 
and therefore makes them vulnerable to a change in the Party leadership in a more radically 
reformist direction.
(b) The Role of Unions in Enterprises
The simplest way to understand the role o f  basic-level union branches within state/big- 
collective enterprises is to situate it within a triadic structure of power and authority involving 
three political forces: the Party branch, in particular the Party secretary; the enterprise director 
and senior management; and the work force and its organisational representatives, the union 
and the workers representative congress. The formal roles of the three forces within the 
enterprise are theoretically equal: the Party is supposed to be the "nucleus" (hexin), the
40 For example, Anita Chan (1993) has analysed this relationship between the Party and the unions as a form of 
"state corporatism". If it is so, it is very extrem e form in w hich the state’s role is overwhelmingly intrusive and 
dominant.
41 The essential elements o f corporatism  have been defined by Schmilter (1974: pp. 93-4) as follows.
"Corporatism refers to a particular set o f  policies and institutional arrangements for structuring interest 
representation. Where such arrangem ents predom inate, the state often charters or even creates interest 
groups, attempts to regulate their number, and give them  the appearance of a quasi-representational 
monopoly along with special prerogatives".
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management the "centre" (zhongxin) and the workers the "m aster"(zhurenw eng). In reality, 
the relationship between these three forces has been shifting and contradictory, reflecting the 
trajectory of the economic reform process as a whole and the relative influence o f  different 
approaches to industrial reform. First, more radical m arket reform ers have sought to redefine 
the structure of authority within the enterprise in favour o f  senior m anagem ent in general, and 
the enterprise director in particular. This was the central thrust behind the Factory Director 
Responsibility System (FDRS) launched in 1984, w hereby enterprises were supposed to 
operate under the "unified leadership of the factory director", while the functions o f  the Party 
were to be confined to "Party construction" and political/ideological work (Cham berlain 1987; 
Chevrier 1990). The ultimate aim of many such reform ers w as to rem ove the Party branch 
from the enteiprise altogether. However, more conservative reform ers and their supporters in 
the Party/state apparatus (particularly in the industrial administration departm ents) have 
attempted to maintain a management role for the enterprise Party organisation, a principle 
which was re-emphasised in the post-Tiananmen period. A  third current o f  industrial reform, 
much weaker than the above two, is the notion o f  "dem ocratic m anagem ent" which grants a 
greater role to the workforce in the management o f  an enterprise, operating through the WRC 
and the union branch as the executive arm o f  the W RC (Cham berlain 1987: 654-658).
The relative strength of these competing approaches has w axed and waned. This has 
brought fluctuating pressures to bear on the internal m icro-politics o f  the enterprise and the 
results have been highly variable and ambiguous. It would be true to say that, from  the 
perspective of the mid-1990's, all three projects have been frustrated and the micro-political 
situation in any one enterprise reflects a distinctive mixture all three, with the first two usually 
being primary. In our survey of workers in the cities o f  Shenyang and Nantong, conducted in 
late 1992, we gained a rough idea of the relative pow er position o f  the three forces from 
responses to a question about how a worker would try to deal with a disagreem ent with an 
immediate superior over issues such as bonuses, promotion or disciplinary action. The results, 
which are based on workers in state and collective enterprises only, are reported in Table 
4:1:42
42 Stalc/collcctive workers accounted for 85 per cent o f  the total sam ple (1276). 1 he totals in each table refer 
only to those who provided an answer to the question.
Table 4:1. Methods of Resolving Differences with Superiors 
Choice of Method Frequency Percent Per cent answered
Do nothing 187 14.7 15.2
Complain to other 231 18.1 18.7
workers
Go to the trade union 135 10.6 10.9
Complain to the 123 9.6 10.0
WRC
Complain to Party 177 13.9 14.3
secretary
Complain to 294 23.0 23.8
enterprise managers
Complain to higher 50 3.9 4.1
authorities
Other 37 2.9 3,0
N.A. or irrelevant 42 3.3 —
TOTAL 1276 100.0 100.0
This suggests that the most efficacious single channel for resolving workers' difficulties was to 
raise the matter with enterprise m anagem ent while the trade union was relatively ineffectual. 
Moreover, given the trade union's close link with the Party within enterprises, the trade union 
channel may have been selected as an indirect route to the Party. However, if one puts the 
union and WRC channel together (20.9 per cent), this indicates that the channel of workers' 
organisation was seen as far from negligible in dealing with everyday problems facing workers. 
The relatively low scoring o f the Party, both absolutely and relative to management, suggests 
that its role in the enterprise has declined during the reform era, compared with its virtually 
unchallenged predominance as o f  1978. This trend is supported by individuals we talked to, 
one of whom reported a popular saying current in the early 1990's to the effect that "At the 
centre, the CCP is a ruling party; in the localities it is an eating and drinking party; in the
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enterprise it is a party out of office; and in the countryside it is an underground p a r t y " .43 That 
said, however, our interviews with enterprise m anagers suggested that conflicts over enterprise 
reform between the Party secretary and director o f  an enterprise are still com m on and, if the 
Party secretary and the union chairperson formed an alliance on a particular issue, it would be 
very difficult for the director to do much about it.
The unions have found themselves awkwardly sandwiched betw een these three forces. 
To the extent that they are still subordinate to Party leadership at the enterprise level, they too 
have lost power concomitantly in the eyes o f their m em bers. But do they then have any role 
within the enterprise? In our survey, workers were asked what aspect o f  the w ork o f  union 
branches in their enterprises made the most impression on them; their responses are reported in 
Table 4:2.
Table 4:2 Workers' Assessment of Union Activities in the Enterprise
Most Significant Frequency Per cent Per cent answering
Activities
Get workers to obey 282 22.1 41.2
and work
Take care of our 162 12.7 23.6
welfare
Represent our views 88 6.9 12.8
and interests
Providing technical 38 3.0 5.5
training
Organising leisure 116 9.1 16.9
activities
N.A. or irrelevant 590 46.2 —
TOTAL 1276 100.0 100.00
43 Interview with a trade union official, Nantong, N ovem ber 1992.
23
The large proportion of workers w ho declined to answer this question or offered no opinion 
(about 46 per cent) suggests a high degree o f  indifference or dismissiveness about the 
significance of union activities. However, o f  those who did indicate an activity, it is significant 
to note how few regarded the unions as "representing their interests and views" (12.8 per cent) 
and how many regarded them as instruments for securing obedience and work effort (41.1 per 
cent). We cannot regard these findings as representative of the situation in the state/large 
collective sector across the country. However, they do suggest that, in these two cities at least, 
while unions do play a limited welfare role within the enterprise, they are still regarded (to the 
extent that they are regarded at all) primarily as organisational instruments of managerial or 
Party priorities and not as autonomous agents o f  workers' interests.
This picture of limited autonom y is supported by workers1 responses when asked how 
the chairperson of the union branch was selected in their work-units. The results are reported 
in Table 4:3.
Table 4:3 Method of Selecting Trade Union Chairperson in Unit
Method of Selection Frequency Percent Per cent answering
Appointed by a 296 23.2 31.5
higher trade union
Appointed by the 148 11.6 15.8
unit's Party 
organisation
Appointed by the 
Unit Manager
142 15.1
Elected by worker 
representatives
269 21.1 28.6
Directly elected 85 6.7 9.0
N.A. or irrelevant 336 26.3
TOTAL 1276 100.0 100.0
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In view of the fact that the Trade Union Law o f  April 1992 specifies that trade union 
officers should be elected by workers or worker representatives, it is significant that, in over 60 
per cent of the cases cited, union chairpersons were appointed by other agencies, w hether they 
be higher-level trade unions or the Party branch/ m anagem ent o f  the unit. W hile it m ight 
appear that a significant proportion (37.6 per cent) were being elected directly o r by worker 
representatives, this is probably misleading because interviews suggested that, in a m ajority o f 
cases of direct or indirect election, the successful candidates turn out to be nom inees. To the 
extent that this is the case, the low figure for chairpersons appointed by the unit Party branch 
(13 per cent) understates the influence of the enterprise Party organisation, and one should also 
remember that the proportion appointed by higher union agencies also reflects the influence o f 
the Party at higher levels. On the whole, these figures suggest that progress towards 
democratisation has been very limited, and that the selection o f  union officers at the enterprise 
level is far from the democratic norm specified in the Trade Union Law.
If the union is still a relatively weak force within the enterprise, one m ight still ask if it 
acquires influence through the WRC, of which it is the officially designated executive agency. 
When respondents were asked if the WRC in their unit was consulted on m ajor issues 
confronting that unit (as opposed to specific issues such as the allocation o f  bonuses and 
housing), the results were as presented in Table 4:4.
Table 4:4 Is the WRC Consulted on the Major Issues Facing the Enterprise?
Response Frequency Per cent Per cent answering
Yes 151 11.8 20.2
In form only 352 27.6 47.1
No 244 19.1 32.7
N.A. or irrelevant 529 41.5
TOTAL 1276 100.0 100.0
The high level of no-responses suggests a high level o f  indifference or ignorance about the 
activity of the WRC. Of those offering any kind of judgem ent, nearly 80 per cent indicated
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that their unit's WRC was either not consulted on major issues or in form only, indicating that 
the influence of the WRC (and thus its executive agent, the trade union) within the enterprise 
was still very limited.
This and other evidence from personal interviews suggests that progress towards 
greater union influence and autonomy within public enterprises has been marginal. Given the 
breakneck pace of industrial reform in the mid-1990’s, however, what of the future for 
enterprise-level unions and for the econom ic role of the union system as a whole? This 
depends on the precise impact o f  attempts to redefine the character of "state ownership" 
through a new system of property rights, a reform which is under way in the mid-1990's. If the 
enterprises manage to break their m oorings from the state, gain a measure of real autonomy in 
their operations and move towards some form o f  share-based system of ownership, then it is 
likely that industrial relations will becom e more enterprise-based and depoliticised. This 
contextual change has been described by Chinese observers in terms of a transition from the 
"three old bodies" (laosanhui) o f a traditional state enterprise to the "three new bodies" of a 
share-based public enterprise. The form er are the enterprise management committee, the WRC 
and the administrative office (with the Party organisation as the eminence rouge within them); 
the latter are the congress of shareholders, the board of directors and the supervisory board. 
Trade union representatives have complained, with some justification, that one of the "three old 
bodies" - the WRC - are atrophying in public enterprises put on a share basis.44
These changes are potentially threatening to the trade unions in these enterprises, in 
their traditional form at least. In the old system, at least when it was in operation before the 
Cultural Revolution, their role may have been minor, but it was guaranteed both politically and 
economically. In the hypothetical post-reform  context of public enterprises, the old role of the 
unions becomes obsolete and they need to seek a new one. Institutional reformers in both the 
Party/state leadership and the trade unions have argued that unions should be granted a formal 
role to act on behalf o f workers in negotiations with the controllers of new-style public 
enterprises. The main trend is towards some kind of tripartite arrangement - involving 
employers, unions and the state - with employers and unions negotiating "collective contracts" 
which are regulated and supervised by the state according to relevant provisions of the Labour 
Law which was introduced in July 1994 to take effect in January 1995 45 While this system 
was being pioneered in 1994 and 1995 in non-state enterprises, the model was being 
considered as applicable to new-style public enterprises. To the extent that each of the two 
parties to negotiations was formally recognised and empowered by the state, this is clearly a
44 Zhongguo Xinwenshe (China News A gency), Beijing, 22 March 1994, in SWB:FE 1966.
45 The "Labour Law of the People's Republic o f  C h in a " w as issued by the Standing Committee of the Eighth 
National People's Congress on July 5. For an English text, see SWIEFE, 2055. Chapter III of the Law regulates 
labour contracts.
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type of corporatist arrangement involving "collective bargaining" over wages and work 
conditions at either the enterprise or sectoral levels.
So far, we have considered the role o f  the unions in their traditional arena o f  activity in 
the state sector. However, one of the big issues facing the official unions is how  to confront the 
challenge of entering the new economic sectors created by the reforms. Their role there will 
inevitably be different from their familiar role in the state sector. In the mid-1990's, their prime 
concern has been with foreign-invested enterprises where industrial relations have tended to 
take on characteristics similar to their countries o f  origin.4b Discussions with labour officials 
in China in late 1994 suggested that Western European enterprises tended to have the best 
labour relations, with the United States a close second; Japan was about average with Hong 
Kong and Taiwan fairly bad and Korea definitely the worst. The unions have fought for 
recognition in these enterprises and, with the fillip provided by the passing o f  the Labour Law 
in mid-1994, have sought to establish union branches with bargaining powers in all enterprises 
in the joint/foreign sector. This has not been easy because some foreign business-people have 
resisted union organisation in their firms and the unions have not necessarily received the 
backing of local governments eager to attract foreign capital and keep foreign investors happy. 
Indeed, union officials allege that some local governm ents have implicitly offered "no union" 
deals to attract foreign investment to their areas. The issue o f  union representation in the 
foreign sector became an increasingly "hot" issue in the early-mid 1990s as the num ber of 
joint/foreign enterprises increased more rapidly and there was increasing incidence o f  labour 
unrest and shocking events (such as a major fire in the Zhili Toy Factory in Shenzhen in 
November 1993 which killed 83 workers).^ The unions were able to use this new atmosphere 
to press their claims for increased representation. To the extent that unions are gradually 
becoming more established in the joint/foreign sector, the ACFTU is becom ing increasingly 
bifurcated, playing radically different roles in different sectors o f  the econom y, a situation 
which cannot but increase the pressure for a comprehensive re-assessm ent o f  their role in the 
Chinese economy as a whole.
Conclusions: Towards Corporatist Industrial Relations?
The acceleration of the economic reforms from 1992 onwards threw the anomalies of 
the union's role in Chinese society into sharper relief. At the level o f  the enterprise, increasing 
diversification of the economic system and accelerated reform o f  the state sector created 
pressures for a redefinition of their role in the direction o f  becom ing a more economically- 
oriented force capable of forming part of a new system o f industrial relations based on a system
: 6 For a detailed study of the impact o f foreign investment on labour in enterprises in X iam en, one of the four 
Special Economic Zones established in 1979, see Howell 1990.
This event received a good deal of public attention in China. For exam ple, sec Z hong H u a i," I houghts on the 
7,hili' tragedy", Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 29 D ecember 1993, translated in BBC, SW B :FK , 1893.
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of institutionalised bargaining with management within a clear regulatory framework 
established through industrial relations legislation.1^  This implied increasing disengagement 
from the Party and greater autonomy for the unions as a separate institution with their own 
legitimate sphere o f operations. However, m ovem ent towards this scenario is a subject of 
political contestation and movement has been slow and halting. The Party's desire to retain 
control over enterprise union branches is partly responsible for this. More conservative figures 
in the Party leadership, including the current head o f  the ACFTU, Wei Jianxing, a member of 
the CCP Politburo, apparently still cling to a traditional Leninist notion of trade unions under 
Party contiol.49 At the same time, however, reformist elements within the Party and 
government at all levels have been willing to consider adopting foreign models of industrial 
relations and to collaborate with the International Labour Organisation in sponsoring their 
introduction. Similar initiatives has been pushed by reformists within the union structure. 
Interviews in China have revealed a hidden struggle by union leaders and officers at all levels 
to redefine the role of unions and increase their autonom y and influence. On the issue of 
escalating labour disputes, for example, union spokespeople have supported the idea of a 
"tripartite mechanism which enables the trade unions and enterprises to open talks, with the 
government as a mediator, so that labour disputes can be put on a normal basis".50
However, while reformist elements within the unions have pressed for a new role, the 
union bureaucracy as a whole has been sluggish to act. As an official in the Ministry of Labour 
interviewed in late 1994 pointed out, "the unions them selves may want to become more 
autonomous, but they are slow and have been criticised for being slow". ^  To put it bluntly, 
they have found their traditional link with the Party and role in the enterprise so comfortable 
that they do not want to leave it. For example, enterprise union leaders have been treated 
virtually as government officials; indeed union posts m ay be one way up into the higher 
reaches of the bureaucracy for competent and ambitious people. One researcher in the Ministry 
of Labour, speaking in late 1994, said that his own research indicated that the trade union head 
tended to represent the enterprise not the workers; he or she were in fact a kind of deputy 
manager: "They like this because it brings them respect " 5 2  Moreover, above the level of the 
enterprise, the political pact established between the ACFTU  and the Party leadership after 
Tiananmen has secured a degree o f influence over the reform policy process which union
48 It is worth noting here that, to the extent that their role in the enterprise becomes more narrowly economic, 
their potential efficacy as an instrument for industrial dem ocracy m ay  well atrophy.
49 Consider, for example, the conservative tone and content o f  W ei's speech at a meeting of the presidium of the 
Executive Committee o f the ACFTU in June 1994, carried in H ebei Ribao (Hebei Daily), Shijiazhuang, 27 June 
1994, in SWB:FE, 2051.
50 Ihe speaker is Feng Tongqing o f  the Chinese W orkers M ovem ent Institute in Beijing, reported by Ming Bao, 
Hong Kong, 23 January 1994, translated in BBC, S W B :F E , 1906.
51 Interview with W ang Rui, deputy division-chief, D epartm ent o f  Labour Relations and Inspection, Ministry of 
Labour, Beijing, 2 November 1994.
52 Interview with X ia Jizhi of the Institute o f Labour Science, M inistry of Labour, Beijing, 2 November 1994.
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leaders may be unwilling to jeopardise. This gives them an institutional interest in maintaining 
their umbilical link with the Party.
If the unions were slow to change over the first fifteen years o f  econom ic reform, the 
rapid socio-economic changes of the early-mid 1990's have increased the pressures for change 
and have strengthened the hand of reformers inside and outside the ACFTU. The decade has 
seen a gradually accelerating escalation of labour unrest in the cities and zones o f  foreign 
investment. ACFTU researchers have carefully documented this phenom enon and their leaders 
use the statistics to press their case for greater influence and autonom y. For example, a survey 
of the labour situation in 44,000 enterprises in the state, TV E and foreign sectors during 1992 
reported 84,286 cases of labour disputes, of which 33.6 per cent were caused by arguments 
over wages and welfare benefits. A partial survey of information provided by local trade union 
federations revealed 155 cases of strikes, slowdowns or dem onstrations in the same year. Of 
these, 27 per cent were sparked by discontent over loss o f  welfare benefits such as pensions in 
state enterprises which were making losses or had ceased production; am ong the 25 per cent o f 
cases caused by "infringing the legal economic rights o f workers", 10 per cent were in the 
foreign sector and involved managers using physical violence and verbal abuse against workers 
or arbitrarily imposing overtime, reducing wages and welfare benefits, or m aintaining harmful 
or dangerous working conditions.53 The situation was further inflam ed by an increasing 
number of labour disputes and scandals in foreign-invested enterprises in the coastal zones 
which received nation-wide publicity during 1993-1995.
While growing labour unrest was an obvious source o f  concern in both union and Party 
leaders, there were two more even more alarming trends. First w as the rapid appearance of 
alternative workers organisations, particularly in the coastal zones but also across the country 
as a whole. For example, a Hong Kong source reported in early 1994 that there were over 800 
unofficial workers' organisations in the Shenzhen Special Econom ic Zone and its environs, set 
up in response to problems with wages and working conditions in foreign-invested enterprises. 
These were underground organisations based on informal, personal relationships and tended to 
operate like secret societies. As such, their methods were less than subtle and, according to the 
report, were "so destructive that foreign investors are quaking in their b o o t s " . T h o u g h  this 
phenomenon was most pronounced in the coastal zones, there was also increasing reports of 
underground worker organisations in major industrial cities such as Beijing, Chongqing,
Wuhan and Shenyang from 1992 onwards. In these cases, the organisations were a response to 
growing labour discontent among workers in state enterprises, particularly by helping workers
53 The A C FIU  Working Class Survey Office, "China's working class in the process o f  transform ation to a 
socialist market economy", Zhongguo Gongyun (Chinese Workers M ovem ent), no. 12, 1993 (D ecem ber 5), pp.
9-13.
54 Wei Shangli, "Trade unions founded spontaneously in various localities in G uangdong", T a n g ta i, 1 long 
Kong, 15 March 1994, in SW B:FE, 1955.
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laid o ff by loss-making or bankrupt enterprises.55 Some o f  them were a "leftist" 
organisational residue o f  the Cultural Revolution, using slogans such as "rescue our Party" and 
"down with the old-line capitalist advocate Deng Xiaoping" to rally supporters.56
The second phenom enon, even more worrying to Party and union leaders, was the 
reappearance o f  a small band o f  labour activists, active both in Beijing and in some o f  the 
coastal zones, who were arguing for free trade unions and castigating the official trade unions 
for their inadequacy in protecting the interests o f  workers. M ore broadly, some o f  the former 
intellectual and student activists from the 1989 Dem ocracy M ovem ent were arguing that their 
failure then had been partly a result o f  their inability to link up with urban workers and identify 
with their concerns, and that they should try to establish a united front with discontented 
workers in their future activities. Though these activists were few and their real capacity to 
affect events very limited, their influence was inflated by the intensity o f  emergent labour 
unrest and by external support from Hong Kong and sympathetic organisations abroad, notably 
the International Confederation o f  Free Trade U n i o n s . 57 Their impact is also due to the fact 
that they are highlighting basic problems concerning the role o f  the official unions about which 
union and Party reformers themselves are increasingly aware and which they realise need to be 
addressed.
Yet the implications o f  these intensifying pressures on the relationship between the 
unions and the Party are ambiguous. W hile growing labour unrest and the threat o f  alternative 
organisations suggest that the trade unions should becom e m ore influential, these trends also 
make the Party, preoccupied with the need for social and political stability, more dependent on 
the unions for maintaining labour peace. A t the heart o f  this am biguity lies the possibility o f  a 
new deal between the Party and the unions. The em ergent com prom ise is a form o f  tripartite 
corporatism  in which the unions continue to maintain close relations with the Party which 
guarantees them a m onopoly in labour representation while at the same time achieving a range 
o f  guaranteed autonom y within a range o f  activity regulated by law. To achieve this solution, 
reformers in the unions confront both the bureaucratic passivity o f  their own organisation and 
the reluctance o f  conservative Party leaders to allow mass organisations greater leeway. Union 
reformers are also aware that they would need to shake o ff  their reputation as an obstacle to 
m arket reforms and play a more positive role in facilitating their implementation rather than 
merely complaining about their consequences. By the m id-1990's, this political contest was 
becom ing acute and the need for change very urgent. Preservation o f  the status quo o f  union
55 For a contem porary review  o f  the situation from a Hong K ong source, see Lu Y ushan," CCP guards against 
m ass disturbances", Ian g ta i, 15 M ay 1994, in SW B :F E , 2011.
56 I x) Ping and Li Tzu-ching, "The enem y's presence is detected in 17 provinces and 33 cities", C heng M ing, 
H ong Kong, 1 June 1994, in SW B :F E , 2015.
57 For a repon on their activities in Shenzhen, see Carl G oldstein and Kari I luus, "N o w orkers’ paradise", Far 
Eastern E conom ic R ev iew , 16 June 1994, pp. 35-36.
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w eakness and subordination means that the situation o f  the unions will become more and more 
anom alous, their ability properly to represent their members will be m ore comprom ised and 
their reputation will be more vulnerable to attacks from radical economic reformers, 
independent labour activists and unofficial workers' organisations. Though the conditions 
seem ripe for a m ove towards tripartite corporatism in Chinese labour relations, the contest 
round this issue is but one microcosm o f the political dilemmas o f  the reform process as a 
whole and how it is resolved depends upon wider changes in the Party leadership and the 
political system in general. M oreover, the attitudes o f  an em ergent managerial/entrepreneurial 
elite (and their foreign counterparts) are important since corporatist arrangements would 
depend upon their support. Tripartism  might prove attractive to them as a way o f  stabilising 
and routinising industrial relations and avoiding the potential threats posed by unauthorised 
labour activism  and unofficial unions.
If these conditions are favourable, however, and such a solution is seriously attempted, 
there are important implications for the future role o f  the unions. A continuing close 
relationship with the Party along Singaporean lines may well be attractive to the unions, not 
only because o f  the advantages accruing from guaranteed m onopoly representation but also 
because it allows them  to retain their policy role to influence the reform process in ways 
beneficial to their members. However, the must enjoy enough independence to be able to hold 
up their side o f  the triangle, in particular because their is often an implicit alliance between the 
other two sides, particularly in areas which seek to attract foreign capital and where the local 
Party/governm ent leadership therefore have an interests in restraining the pow er o f  workers. If  
their independence and influence in not guaranteed in some way, then a new system o f 
tripartite accom m odation could turn out to be a new form o f  subordination o f  the unions and 
their constituency.
Even if the political conditions are favourable to a coiporatist solution, however, its 
feasibility rem ains in doubt. China is not a city-state like Singapore and any effort to establish 
corporatist institutions will run foul o f  the country's size and regional diversity and the 
increasing com plexity and dynam ism  o f  its economy. W hile corporatist institutions may work 
better for larger enterprises in the public, private and foreign-invested sectors, small enterprises, 
where the nature o f  labour systems is very different (notably the vast TVE sector) would be far 
less am enable to some kind o f  nationally defined and imposed system o f  industrial relations. 
Local solutions may well evolve with considerable diversity between regions. M oreover, the 
rapidly grow ing diversity o f  the Chinese labour force and the diverse problems it faces means 
that there will inevitably be conflicts between different sectors o f  the workforce and there will 
Iways be the potential challenge o f  rival organisations. It is too much to expect that the 
Chinese labour scene can be contained within a coiporatist straitjacket.
Thus the future associational sphere o f  workers' organisations is likely to be diverse 
and volatile, as the official unions gradually bend the bars o f  their cage to becom e m em bers o f  
a corporatist system o f  industrial relations, but are increasingly challenged by unofficial or 
underground worker organisations. To this extent, the official trade unions have not travelled 
far down the road towards becoming true elements o f  an emergent "civil society"; any 
enhanced autonom y that they may enjoy in the new system o f  "tripartism" is still heavily 
circumscribed by their continuing dependence on and subordination to the Party. As such, they 
cede the role o f  true "civil society" organisations to their rivals in the unofficial and 
underground sphere o f  industrial relations. In political terms, this m eans that they m ust be 
regarded as a conservative force because they share a comm on cause with conservative Party 
leaders who wish to slow the pace o f  economic reform and avoid significant political reform. 
The latter m ight threaten to break their link with the powers-that-be and destroy their m onopoly 
right to "represent" the working class.
Yet the time for a much more decisive change in their role is rapidly approaching since 
they face enemies on two fronts: on one side, the economic reforms are eroding their traditional 
base in state enterprises; on the other side, alternative worker organisations are challenging 
their credibility and competence. If  the political atm osphere changes in a m ore radically 
reformist direction, they m ay find themselves lacking political friends or protection and thus 
run the risk o f  losing the limited gains they have m ade already.
N um ber o f  W ords: 16,904
D ate o f  Draft: 27 April 1995.
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